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NOTES
Family Law-Attorney Mediation of Marital Disputes and
Conflict of Interest Considerations
A recent trend toward the increasing use of mediation services and
nonadversarial proceedings in the resolution of marital disputes has raised a
serious question as to whether attorney mediation of domestic disuptes vio-
lates the ethical "conflict of interest" standards of the legal profession. This
note will examine this concern in light of the need for flexibility in dealing
with an often already tragic situation. As a result of the adoption of no-fault
divorce legislation in the majority of American jurisdictions,' it has become
increasingly unnecessary to consider fault in divorce actions. Under current
divorce laws, fault issues are usually raised only in conjunction with questions
of spousal support, property division, and child custody.2 Though the adver-
sary system is still necessary in a no-fault divorce action when a couple is
unable or unwilling to reach a voluntary settlement agreement, frequently an
adversarial approach operates against the best interests of the parties by creat-
ing conflicts that did not exist originally.3 Often the parties agree on the desir-
ability of obtaining a divorce and wish to end the marriage in the most
expeditious manner possible. They prefer to settle their differences out of
court because they both fear the strangeness and formality of the courtroom
and wish to avoid the high cost and embarrassment of litigation.4
The public's desire for an alternative to courtroom resolution of marital
conflicts has resulted in the increasing use of mediation services. In the media-
tion process the couple meets with a neutral third party who takes an active
part in the discussion of issues and makes affirmative suggestions for the reso-
lution of disagreements.5 The mediator's objectives in a separation or divorce
1. As of October 1980 forty-eight states had adopted no-fault divorce laws. Currently only
Illinois and South Dakota require fault grounds for divorce. Freed and Foster, Divorce in the
Fifty States: An Outline, 11 Faro. L.Q. 297, 300 (1977); I. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, § 401 (Smith-Hurd
1980); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 201(c) (Purdon 1980 Cum. Supp.) (allowing no-fault divorce);
S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. § 25-4-2 (1976).
2. For a discussion of fault as a consideration in alimony, spousal support, and property
division awards pursuant to a no-fault divorce, see Annot., 86 A.L.R.3d 1116 (1978); Freed and
Foster, supra note 1, at 305-10.
When no-fault divorce statutes fail to specify whether fault is a proper consideration in deter-
mining issues of alimony, usal support, pd roprty divion, the matter has been left to judi-
cial determination. E.g., Huggins v. Huggins, 57 Ala. App. 691, 331 So. 2d 704 (1976); Juick v.
Juick, 21 Cal. App. 3d 421, 427, 98 Cal. Rptr. 324, 329 (1971).
3. Buttenweiser, Horan, Strauss, & Williams, Professional Responsibility in the Practice of
Family Law, in Professional Responsibility of the Lawyer 73, 74-75 (N. Galston ed. 1977); Pickrell
& Bendheim, Family Disputes Mediation-A New Service for Lawyers and Their Clients, 7 Bar-
rister 27, 28 (1980); Note, Non-Judicial Resolution of Custody and Visitation Disputes, 12 U. Cal.
D.L. Rev. 582, 583-84 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Non-Judicial Resolution].
4. Meroney, Mediation and Arbitration of Separation and Divorce Agreements, 15 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 467, 469 (1979).
5. "Mediation" is to be distinguished from "conciliation" in which the neutral third party
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case are to aid the parties in reaching an acceptable compromise of their posi-
tions and to facilitate a voluntary settlement.6
In order for the mediation process to be successful, the mediator must
encourage the couple to assess their demands realistically and to accommodate
their differences, rather than to magnify them. The parties must be willing to
communicate and to arrive at a fair settlement without consideration of fault. 7
Theoretically, parties who voluntarily and maturely have reached their own
agreement, rather than a court-imposed one, are more likely to be satisfied
with the results and less likely to avoid compliance or to engage in repetitive
and costly litigation.8
Public demand for these mediation services has developed for several rea-
sons. Mediation of the uncontested divorce reduces the artificially created
hostility which can be a by-product of adversarial proceedings. 9 Mediation
also reduces the financial burden of a contested divorce case.' 0 This burden
can be extremely debilitating to individuals who are suddenly responsible for
the maintenance of two households instead of one. Additionally, a mediated
custody agreement is preferable to a court-imposed settlement in several ways.
It is evident that in most cases the parents are the individuals who have the
greatest understanding of the needs of their children. They are, therefore,
most capable of determining what is in the "best interests of the child.""
When the parents resolve custody matters privately, they are no longer at the
mercy of a judge who often has little knowledge of the needs and interests of
the particular family.' 2 The children are not subjected to the psychologically
damaging strain of an adversarial procedure.13 They are not put in the diffi-
cult position of determining which parent with whom to live.' 4 Instead these
decisions are made by the parents through the give-and-take of the mediation
process.
takes a more passive role, analogous to that of a marriage counselor. The conciliator merely
creates a situation that will be conducive to the objective discussion of issues. He does not attempt
to interject personal suggestions for compromise. Meroney, supra note 4, at 470. The mediator
may alternate between the roles of conciliator and mediator, depending on the course of the dis-
cussion. Id. at 470-71, n. 21. In both mediation and conciliation the third party promotes negotia-
tion, while in arbitration the neutral third party serves in a quasi-judicial role. The parties have
submitted to arbitration with a prior agreement to accept as final and binding the decision of the
arbitrator. Id.; Pickrell & Bendaeim, supra note 3.
6. Id.; Meroney, supra note 4, at 470.
7. Meroney, supra note 4, at 486; Steinberg, The Therapeutic Potential of the Divorce Pro-
cess, 62 A.B.AJ. 617, 619 (1976).
8. Steinberg, supra note 7, at 620.
9. See authorities cited in note 3 and accompanying text supra.
10. This is particularly true in a contested custody case which may involve expert witness fees
for psychologists and social workers as well as lenghty depositions and high legal fees. See Non-
Judicial Resolution, at 585-86.
11. See Spencer and Zammit, Mediation-Arbitration: A Proposal for Private Resolution of
Disputes Between Divorced or Separated Parents, 1976 Duke L.J. 911, 932-33.
12. Id. at 916-17, 939.
13. See Non-Judicial Resolution, supra note 3, at 584-85.
14. See Simons, The Invisible Scars of Children of Divorce, 7 Barrister 14 (1980), Simons
states that the number of children affected by divorce is increasing. In 1956, 361,000 children's
parents became divorced. That number has tripled to approximately one million children a year
currently. Id. at 15.
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Mediation of the uncontested divorce also promotes the important public
interest of relieving crowded court dockets' 5 by reducing the number of con-
tested divorce cases going to court, specifically child custody cases. When the
parties are able to resolve custody disputes during the mediation process there
is no necessity for a prolonged initial custody hearing. 16 Furthermore, if the
parties have reached their own custody agreement they will feel responsible
for its success and will be less prone to litigate matters of custody and visita-
tion after the marriage is dissolved.'
7
Despite public demand for mediation services' 8 many lawyers are reluc-
tant, for several reasons, to act as mediators in marital disputes. The role of
neutral mediator is quite different from the attorney's traditional role as an
advocate who acts as a "hired gun" for his client.' 9 Attorneys may believe
they lack sufficient training in this form of client counseling.20 They may fear
that attorney mediation of domestic disputes violates the ethical standards of
the legal profession.21 In addition, many mediation services prefer not to em-
ploy attorneys as mediators on the assumption that legal training is inconsis-
tent with the tempering of client demands necessary to make the mediation
process successful. 22 Thus attorneys are not currently involved in mediation
in large numbers.
In part because of the unavailability of attorney mediators, divorcing
spouses have turned to mediation and conciliation services organized or
funded by state legislatures,23 judicial systems,24 and privately operated orga-
15. See note 24 infra.
16. Non-Judicial Resolution, supra note 3, at 584.
17. Id. at 593-95.
18. See text accompanying notes 9-17 supra.
19. G. Hazard, Ethics in the Practice of Law 80 (1978); Pick, The Go-Between, 8 Student
Law. 39, 58 (1980).
20. See 0. Coogler, Structured Mediation in Divorce Settlement 85 (1978); Shaffer, Lawyers,
Counselors, and Counselors at Law, 61 A.B.A.J. 854, 855 (1975).
21. See notes 37-44 and accompanying text infra; Note, Simultaneous Representation:
Transaction Resolution in the Adversary System, 28 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 86, 87 (1977).
22. Pick, supra note 19, at 58-59. According to Pick, lawyer-mediators comprise only 15% of
the national total. Id. at 59. Lawyers who work as mediators with the American Arbitration
Association are not permitted to give legal advice or function as attorneys. Pickrell & Bendheim,
supra note 3, at 28. But see Non-Judicial Resolution, supra note 3, at 596 n. 78. Under the Family
Law Mediator Program, established by the San Fernando Valley Bar Association in California,
family law attorneys volunteer to act as mediators in family law matters. Id.
23. The New York Court Act provides for informal conciliation services available on the
petition of one of the parties. N.Y. Jud. Law §§ 911-26 (McKinney 1975). See Blum, Conciliation
Courts: Instruments of Peace, 41 J. ST. B. CAL. 33 (1966) for a description of conciliation courts in
California. See also Jenkins, Divorce California Style, 9 STUDENT LAW. 31 (1981) for a discussion
of mandatory conciliation procedures in California.
The Dispute Settlement Center in Chapel Hill, N.C. received $7,000.00 funding from the
North Carolina General Assembly in 1979 and $27,000.00 funding for the year ending June 30,
1981. Interview with Evelyn Smith, Program Coordinator of the Dispute Settlement Center of
Chapel Hill, N.C., (Oct. 1, 1980). There are predictions that the New York and Florida legisla-
tures will provide similar funding for neighborhood dispute resolution centers in the near future.
Pick, supra note 19, at 59.
24. Judicial mediation was attempted in 1979 in a superior court in Riverside County, Cali-
fornia because of a severe backlog of civil cases. A judge was removed from his regular caseload
and assigned to handle settlement conferences exclusively. The program resulted in the settlement
19811
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nizations.25 Most of these services are staffed by mediators who are trained in
the behavioral sciences or who have received specialized training as mediators
in their employment.26 Apparently, however, the nonattorney mediator is not
allowed to give any type of legal advice because of state statutes prohibiting
the unauthorized practice of law.27 The parties, consequently, may agree on
issues of property settlement, support and child custody with no knowledge of
the legal rights that they are relinquishing or of the tax advantages that they
are foregoing.28
Because legal advice is frequently desirable prior to entering into a final
separation agreement, it is often necessary for the parties to employ an attor-
ney outside the mediation process in order to ensure the legal validity of their
agreement.29 Even at this stage a single attorney may be reluctant to handle
of 614 cases in ten months and in the elimination of the backlog. Rich, Personal Viewpoint: An
Experiment with Judicial Mediation, 66 A.B.A.J. 530 (1980).
The Domestic Relations Department of the Los Angeles Superior Court in California is an-
other example ofjudicially sponsored mediation. This Department refers parties to the Center for
Legal Psychiatry at U.C.L.A. for in-depth divorce counseling. Non-Judicial Resolution, at 596 n.
79.
25. There are private mediation services throughout the United States. The American Arbi-
tration Association, Family Dispute Services, provides mediators for marital disputes. Pickrell &
Bendheim, supra note 3, at 28; Non-Judicial Resolution, supra note 3, at 592.
The Family Mediation Association, a nonprofit organization located in Winston-Salem, N.C.,
provides mediators to couples at an hourly fee. The association also provides the facilities for
mediation sessions. For a description of the procedure used by the Family Mediation Association,
see 0. Coogler, supra note 20, at 23-29, 31-38, 131-44; Meroney, supra note 4, at 476.
Labor management negotiators in New York City began the Institute for Mediation and
Conflict Resolution in New York in 1969. The Institute now supervises two dispute settlement
centers in New York. Standord, Gentle Art of Settling Family Disputes, Charlotte Observer,
Sept. 14, 1980, (Parade Magazine) at 7-8.
26. 0. Coogler, supra note 20, at 75-78. American Arbitration Association mediators un-
dergo approximately 35 hours of training with the AAA. Pick, supra note 19, at 39. Mediators for
the Dispute Settlement Center in Chapel Hill originally received approximately forty hours of
training from the Community Relations Service of the U.S. Justice Department. Currently the
Center administers its own weekend training sessions. Interview with Evelyn Smith, supra note
23.
27. For a summary of state statutes and cases dealing with the unauthorized practice of law
see Chicago American Bar Foundation, Unauthorized Practice Handbook (J. Fischer and D.
Lachman eds. 1972).
The Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee of the North Carolina State Bar determined in
1980 that the preparation of a contract by a nonattomey mediator constituted the unauthorized
practice of law. Apparently the basis for the decision was that the contract contained terms
"whereby a husband and wife agree to give up rights and remedies under the divorce, alimony,
and other statutes by substituting binding arbitration for these rights." Council Ac-
tion/Committee Reports, Unauthorized Practice of Law, 27 N.C. St. B.Q. 4, 5 (1980). The Com-
mittee further decided that advice by the organization as to the "advisability of and legal effect of
entering into such an agreement also constitutes the unauthorized practice of law." Id. at 7.
28. Under Family Mediation Association (FMA) procedure the couple selects an "advisory
attorney" from a panel of attorneys who have applied for membership in the FMA. The couple
may also choose a nonpanel attorney if the attorney agrees to abide by FMA rules and procedures.
The selected attorney supervises the drafting and execution of the final settlement agreeent, im-
partially explains terms of the agreement to each party, and gives advice-including tax advice-
concerning the legal implications of the agreement. 0. Coogler, supra note 20, at 86, 142, 172,
193-202.
29. American Arbitration Association mediators draft a "Memorandum in Mediation" for
the parties. The couple then takes the agreement to an attorney who drafts the final separation
agreement. Pickrell & Bendheim, supra note 3, at 28.
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the case for both parties.30 The couple, therefore, incurs the previously
avoided expense of hiring separate attorneys, along with the risk that the law-
yers' assumption of an adversarial role will cause hostilities that were hoped to
be averted.3 1
The need for attorney mediators is growing because of a combination of
factors. The increasing demand for mediation services in general3 2 has sur-
passed the availability of nonattorney mediation services. 33 Furthermore, le-
gal advice is vital in any mediation process aimed at settling property and
custody disputes. In light of this developing trend, attorneys should consider
whether hesitation to serve as mediators is justified.
There are two major reasons for attorney reluctance to become involved
in mediation. The first is a belief by the individual attorney that he lacks
sufficient counseling skills to adequately control discussions with such poten-
tial for emotional volatility. It is relatively easy, however, to remedy a defi-
ciency in counseling skills. The attorney who lacks training or experience with
mediation counseling could participate in training sessions similar to those at-
tended by lay mediators.34 Co-mediation with a trained counselor could also
be used to supplement the skills of the inexperienced attorney, although this
may increase the cost of mediation.3
5
The second major factor inhibiting attorney involvement in mediation
services pertains to ethical considerations. The most significant ethical di-
lemma arising out of attorney mediation of domestic disputes is posed by the
"conflict of interest" provisions of the American Bar Association (ABA) Code
of Professional Responsibility.36 The applicable provision, Disciplinary Rule
30. See notes 45-53 and accompanying text infra.
31. See generally G. Hazard, supra note 19, at 80.
32. Mediation services are expected to spread to smaller cities as a result of the popularity of
mediation in urban areas. Pick, supra note 19, at 59.
33. See Steinberg, supra note 7, at 618.
34. See note 26 and accompanying text supra. Merder, The Need for an Expanded Role for
the Attorney in Divorce Counseling, 4 Fain. L.Q. 280, 288 (1970); Mussehl, From Advocate to
Counselor: The Emerging Role of the Family Law Practitioner, 12 Gonz. L. Rev. 443, 448 (1977);
Non-Judicial Resolution, supra note 3, at 597-98.
See New York State Trial Lawyers' Association Code of Professional Responsibility, [1975] 1
Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 3115. Section 6(a) of the Code states, "(t)he matrimonial lawyer shall en-
courage, counsel and advise negotiation toward the settlement of marital and/or family problems
by agreement before litigation." Id. at 3116.
35. Interview with Susan Lewis, a private practitioner in Durham and Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, (Oct. 8, 1980). Ms. Lewis has practiced marital mediation for three years and occasion-
ally works in conjunction with a psychologist. She suggests that any attorney who is inexperi-
enced in mediation consider working with a trained counselor to provide the counseling necessary
in the mediation process. Even after obtaining sufficient counseling skills, the attorney may wish
to work with a psychologist in cases in which the parties are highly emotional. See Steinberg,
supra note 7.
To avoid a violation of Disciplinary Rule (DR) 3-102(A) of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, the attorney should refrain from sharing legal fees with the nonlawyer. American
Bar Association, Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 3-102(A) (1979), reprinted in T. Mor-
gan & R. Rotunda, 1979 Standards Supplement to Problems and Materials on Professional Re-
sponsibility 25 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA Code]. The attorney should also avoid forming a
partnership with the nonlawyer to prevent a violation of DR 3-103(A). Id. at 3-103(A).
36. E.g., ABA Code, supra note 35, at Ethical Consideration (EC) 5-14, 5-15, 5-16, 5-19, 5-20,
DR 5-105(A)-(C).
1981]
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(DR) 5-105(A), requires that a lawyer decline employment if the employment
will adversely affect his judgment or if he will be required to represent differ-
ent interests. 37 The purpose of the restriction on multiple representation is to
maintain the lawyer's independent professional judgment and to ensure ade-
quate representation of the interests of each client.38 Under a separate provi-
sion of the Code, DR 5-105(C), however, a lawyer may represent multiple
clients if three conditions are met. First, it must be obvious that he can ade-
quately represent the interests of each client. Second, each client must consent
to the joint representation. Third, the consent of each client must be given
afterfull disclosure of the possible effect of multiple representation on the ex-
ercise of the lawyer's independent professional judgment. 39 The lawyer is in-
structed to "resolve all doubts against the propriety of the representation" if
the clients have "potentially differing interests." 40
The presence or absence of litigation is a factor in determining the propri-
ety of representing multiple clients. The lawyer is advised that he should
never represent in litigation multiple clients with differing interests. 41 This
rule has been applied even when both parties have consented to multiple rep-
resentation after full disclosure of potential undesirable consequences 42
When no litigation is involved, the attorney must balance factors that in-
dicate the potential harm to clients from joint representation against those
favoring the employment of only one attorney. Some of the factors to be con-
sidered include the degree to which the clients' interests potentially differ, the
possibility of increased hostility and expense resulting from the employment of
separate attorneys, the desire of the parties to have the attorney serve in a
neutral capacity as opposed to taking an adversarial role, and the ability of the
37. Id. at DR 5-105(A). The text of DR 5-105(A) reads:
A lawyer shall decline proferred employment if the exercise of his independent profes-
sional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the
acceptance of the proferred employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in repre-
senting different interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
38. Id. at EC 5-14, DR 5-105(C). The ABA has stated that the underlying view for preclud-
ing the attorney from representing conflicting interests is that "a client is entitled to the benefit of
his lawyer's undivided judgment, unfettered by commitments or loyalty to others." ABA Comm.
on Professional Ethics Informal Opinions, No. 1233 (1972).
39. ABA Code, supra note 35, at DR 5-105(C).
40. Id. at EC 5-15.
41. (Emphasis added.) See, e.g., Klemm v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 509 (1977); Greene v. Greene, 47 N.Y.2d 447, 391 N.E.2d 1355, 418 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1979);
Jedwabny v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 390 Pa. 231, 135 A.2d 252 (1957).
42. See cases cited in note 41 supra. A possible explanation for this distinction is that the
"obvious" standard of DR 5-105(C) creates a per se rule under which multiple representation can
never be undertaken when the parties are opponents in litigation. Kaufman, A Critical First Look
at the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A.J. 1074, 1079 (1980). The "conflict of
interest" provision of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct omits the "obvious" requirement
of the current Code. Discussion Draft of ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, § 1.8, re-
printed in [1980] 26 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) (Supp. Feb. 20, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Model Rules
of Professional Conduct]. See note 72 supra.
Another rationale for the distinction is that withdrawal of the attorney due to an increase in
conflict will normally have less detrimental effect on the clients if the matter is not currently in
litigation. R. Wise, Legal Ethics 77-78 (2d ed. 1970); ABA Code, supra note 35, at EC 5-15.
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clients to protect their interests with only limited representation. 43 The attor-
ney must bear in mind the possibility that an initially uncontested divorce may
escalate into an action requiring litigation. If this should occur the attorney
would be required to withdraw from representation of either party, resulting
in hardship to the clients.44
If the attorney accepts multiple employment in a divorce action, and his
decision is later found to have been erroneous, the penalties could be severe.
A party alleging injury caused by the conflict of interest may bring a civil
malpractice action against the attorney,45 who could be sanctioned by a legal
ethics committee,46 and the divorce decree could be subject to collateral attack
by a party alleging fraud, duress or overreaching.47
Although the Code leaves open the possibility of multiple representation,
some jurisdictions absolutely preclude multiple representation in a divorce ac-
tion, even where no-fault and dissolution-of-marriage statutes have been
adopted.48 The four principal reasons given for this rule are: (1) the existence
of inherently differing interests between the spouses that may later become the
subject of adversary litigation;4 9 (2) the existence of obstacles that prevent a
lawyer representing both spouses from obtaining the information necessary for
the adequate representation of the parties;50 (3) the need to avoid an appear-
43. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 702, 727
(1977); Weddington, A Fresh Approach to Preserving Independent Judgment-Canon 6 of the
Proposed Code of Professional Responsibility, 11 Ariz. L. Rev. 31, 35-6 (1969).
44. ABA Code, supra note 35, at EC 5-15; Non-Judicial Resolution, supra note 3, at 597-99;
Note, supra note 21, at 94.
45. E.g., Woodruffv. Tomlin, 593 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1979); Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App.
2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968); Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1966); Kelly v. Greason, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 244 N.E.2d 456, 296 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1968).
The consent of the parties to joint representation would not bar recovery in a malpractice
action if the attorney has violated the ordinary standard of care by the initial acceptance of multi-
ple employment, by failing to maintain a neutral position with the parties, or by failing to ade-
quately disclose the limited nature of joint representation. Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App.
2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966); Note, supra note 21, at 94.
46. E.g., People v. Selby, 156 Colo. 17, 396 P.2d 598 (1964); In re Opacek, 257 Minn. 600, 101
N.W.2d 606 (1960). See Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 835, 844-45 (1968).
47. E.g., Jensen v. Jensen, 97 Idaho 922, 557 P.2d 200 (1976); Holmes v. Holmes, 145 Ind.
App. 52, 248 N.E.2d 564 (1969). See Smith v. Price, 253 N.C. 285, 116 S.E.2d 733 (1960); Note,
Possible Effect of Conflict of Interests in a Divorce Action Arising from Only One Attorney Ob-
taining the Divorce Decree, 15 Ala. L. Rev. 502, 507 (1963).
But see Brosie v. Stockton, 105 Ariz. 574, 468 P.2d 933 (1970) (court refused to set aside a
property settlement because plaintiff failed to allege damages resulting from joint representation);
Todd v. Rhodes, 108 Kan. 64, 193 P. 894 (1920) (when husband employed the same attorney to
represent both parties to the divorce he could not subsequently attack the divorce on grounds of
joint representation); Halvorsen v. Halvorsen, 3 Wash. App. 827, 479 P.2d 161 (1970) (court re-
fused to set aside property settlement because joint representation by one attorney was proper
under the circumstances).
48. Ohio Bar Ethics Committee, Formal Opinion No. 30, reprinted in [1975] 1 Fain. L. Rep.
(BNA) 3109; N.Y. County Law. Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 258 (1972)
reprinted in 2 Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the Association of the Bars of
the City of New York and the New York County Lawyers' Association (1980) [hereinafter cited as
N.Y. Opinions]; Note, supra note 21, at 95.
49. Ohio Bar Ethics Comm., supra note 48, at 3109; N.Y. Opinions, supra note 48.
50. Ohio Bar Ethics Comm., supra note 48, at 3110; Note, supra note 21, at 99. Obstacles
include the reluctance of the parties to disclose all relevant information because they fear that
harmful disclosures may be used later by the opposing spouse in a contested action. It is a general
1981]
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ance of impropriety;51 and (4) the interest of the state in child custody, settle-
ment of property rights and the marital status of the parties. 52
Before one concludes that an attorney should never represent both parties
in an uncontested divorce action, it should be noted that such representation is
permissible in many jurisdictions if the parties have previously resolved all
conflicts and if the attorney has obtained the consent of both clients after full
disclosure of the implications of common representation. 53 Furthermore,
there are valid policy reasons for allowing the attorney to act as a mediator. 54
In mediation, the parties enter the process with the intent to resolve con-
flicts and to avoid litigation.55 Although the interests of the couple diverge in
some areas, they are not yet "conflicting" because the parties have not decided
to pursue them aggressively.56 The attorney can inform the clients from the
outset that he is not acting as an advocate for either party. Consequently there
is little possibility that either spouse will rely on the attorney for adversarial
advice. Since the attorney does not hold himself out as being the representa-
tive of each party in an adversarial situation, any appearance of impropriety is
lessened. In a sense the mediator is acting as the attorney for the mediation
process rather than for the individual clients. 57 He must, therefore, inform the
clients that he will withdraw from the representation of either party prior to
the subsequent divorce action, whether it is contested or not.58
Although the attorney-mediator has a fiduciary duty to give correct and
appropriate advice on tax matters and on the possible legal effects of any
agreement, he should not propose a specific plan for the terms of the agree-
ment.59 These decisions ultimately are left to the discretion of the couple.
Upon entering mediation the parties have usually decided that they have the
emotional maturity and independence necessary to protect their own interests
and to conduct their own negotiations. A client, however, who is insecure
about his or her ability to make an independent decision should be advised to
rule of evidence that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to a communication made by ajoint client if it is relevant to the common interests of the parties and is offered in an action
between the clients. Uniform Rule of Evidence 502(d)(5) reprinted in Federal Judicial Center,
Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates 253, 269 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Rules of Evidence]. See text accompanying notes 86-87 infra.
51. Note, supra note 21, at 99. See Note, supra note 47, at 507.
52. Note, supra note 21, at 98. See Greene v. Greene, 47 N.Y.2d 447, 391 N.E.2d 1355, 418
N.Y.S.2d 379 (1979); Mich. St. B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 85 (1945), re-
printed in 38 Mich. St. B.J. 112 (1959). This argument is somewhat outdated by current divorce
laws that allow the couple, by voluntary agreement, to deal with the incidents of marriage in any
reasonable manner. See note I and accompanying text supra.
53. Klemm v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509(1977). See [1977] 3 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 2633; Note, supra note 21, at 95-109.
54. See notes 9-17 and accompanying text supra.
55. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
56. G. Hazard, 78-79.
57. Id. at 58-68.
58. See ABA Code, supra note 35, at EC 5-20; N.Y. Opinions, supra note 48, 258; Code of
Professional Responsibility of the North Carolina State Bar, N.C. Gen. Stat. App. VII, EC 5-20, at
337 (1979 Cum. Supp.) [hereinafter cited as N.C. Code].
, 59. Interview with Susan Lewis, supra note 35; see Non-Judicial Resolution, supra note 3, at598.
[Vol. 60
A TTORAEY MEDIA TION
employ an outside attorney for advice on choosing a particular course of ac-
tion. 60 If the attorney determines that one of the parties is particularly vulner-
able to domination by the other spouse, or is willing to give up everything to
"get it all over with," he should advise the dominated party to retain separate
counsel, and the attorney-mediator should seriously consider total withdrawal
from mediation. 6'
Support for attorney mediation may be found in Ethical Consideration
(EC) 5-20 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. 62 This provision
states in pertinent part:
A lawyer is often asked to serve as an impartial arbitrator or media-
tor in matters which involve present or former clients. He may serve
in either capacity if he first discloses such present or former relation-
ships. After a lawyer has undertaken to act as an impartial arbitrator
or mediator, he should not thereafter represent in the dispute any of
the parties involved.63
EC 5-20 is somewhat ambiguous in several respects. First, it fails to state
whether the mediator, as well as the arbitrator, is required to be impartial. 64
Second, it fails to specify whether the three conditions for multiple representa-
tion stated in DR 5-105(C) also apply to the attorney-mediator. 65 A possible
interpretation of the provisions is that the attorney who is acting as a mediator
is not "representing" the parties. It is only after the mediation process is ter-
minated that the attorney is precluded from "representation." It could be ar-
gued that if this is the proper construction of EC 5-20, the attorney-mediator is
outside the scope of DR 5-105, which speaks in terms of "adequate representa-
tion," "representation" after full disclosure, and "representation" of different
interests.66
Ethical committees have followed this mediation-representation distinc-
tion in interpreting the Code. An opinion of the New York Committee on
Professional Ethics defines an attorney's duties in representing both a husband
and wife in a divorce action according to his role in the case. 67 The Commit-
tee states, "It would be improper in a domestic relations case for a lawyer
representing one spouse to undertake any form of representation of the
other."68 In the same opinion, however, the Committee states that "[a] lawyer
approached by husband and wife in a matrimonial matter and asked to repre-
sent both, may, however, properly undertake to serve as a mediator or arbitra-
60. Interview with Susan Lewis, note 35 supra.
61. See Steinberg, supra note 7, at 619; Note, supra note 21, at 100.
62. ABA Code, supra note 35, at EC 5-20.
63. Id.
64. Though this seems a trivial distinction, some commentators believe the role of the media-
tor varies significantly when he is not required to be "impartial" as required of the arbitrator. G.
Hazard, supra note 19, at 62-63.
65. See notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra.
66. ABA Code, supra note 35, at DR 5-105(A), (C).
67. N.Y. Opinions, supra note 48.
68. Id.
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tor."69 This is subject to the caveat that the mediator cannot later represent
either spouse if his efforts at mediation are unsuccessful. 70 Apparently the
Committee believed that the role of the attorney determines the definition of
representation, implying that representation in an adversary capacity involves
different duties from those required when the lawyer is acting in a mediator's
role.71
The ABA Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct,72 similarly de-
lineate the attorney's ethical duties by the role that the attorney is perform-
ing.73 Section 5 of the Model Rules deals with the situation in which a lawyer
acts as an intermediary between clients. 74 The conditions for acting as an in-
termediary under section 5.1 are satisfied when: (1) The possibility of adjust-
ing the clients' interests is strong; (2) Each client will be able to make
adequately informed decisions in the matter; (3) There is little likelihood that
any of the clients will be significantly prejudiced if the contemplated adjust-
ment of interests is unsuccessful; (4) The lawyer can act impartially and with-
out improperly affecting other services the lawyer is performing for any of the
clients; and (5) The lawyer fully explains to each client the implications of the
common representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and ob-
tains each client's consent to the common representation. 75
The introduction to section 5 states that "[u]nder some circumstances, a
lawyer may act as an intermediary between spouses in arranging the terms of
an uncontested separation or divorce settlement." 76 Apparently "some cir-
cumstances" exist when all the conditions of section 5.1 are met. The com-
ment to section 5.1 of the Model Rules, however, indicates possible adverse
effects of mediation.77 These include the increase in antagonism during medi-
ation, the additional cost and embarrassment to the parties because of prema-
ture discontinuation of the mediation process, and the probable loss of client-
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra. See generally G. Hazard, supra note 19, at 58-
68. The author states that in some bargaining relationships the attorney may act as the "lawyer
for the situation." He further states that the determination whether a conflict of interest exists
between the parties may depend on the role that the lawyer assumes. Id. at 78.
72. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 42. The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct were developed by the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards of the ABA.
The Commission was appointed in 1977 when the ABA Board of Governors concluded that the
bar should rethink the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Commission presented a discus-
sion draft of the Model Rules at the February 1980 Midyear Meeting of the ABA. The final
proposed rules were to be formally submitted for consideration to the ABA House of Delegates in
February 1981. Kutak, Coming: The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A.J. 47
(1980). See Huber, Competition at the Bar and the Proposed Code of Professional Standards, 57
N.C.L. Rev. 557, 560 (1979); [1980] U.S.L.W. 2527, 2531.
73. The Model Rules are organized according to categories such as adviser, advocate, negoti-
ator, intermediary between clients and legal evaluator. Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
supra note 42, at 1.
74. Id. at 22-3.
75. Id. at 22.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. 78 The comment as-
serts that clients should be informed before beginning mediation of the possi-
bility that the lawyer may be compelled to testify in a later divorce action
between the parties.
The Model Code is innovative in that it specifically authorizes attorney
mediation of an uncontested separation or divorce and lists the specific condi-
tions to be met before an attorney can undertake mediation. Satisfaction of
the same conditions, however, should permit multiple representation under
DR 5-105 of the current Code.79 When the possibility of adjusting the clients'
interests is strong, when each client is able to make adequately informed deci-
sions, when there is little likelihood of significant prejudice to either client if
mediation is unsuccessful, and when the lawyer can act impartially, the "obvi-
ous" standard of DR 5-105(C) should be satisfied. Furthermore, the disclo-
sure and consent requirements of the Model Rules are nearly identical to those
expressed in DR 5-105(C).80
In addition to conflict of interest problems, attorneys contemplating medi-
ation may be concerned with the preservation of confidential information dis-
closed during mediation. Cannon 4 of the current ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility requires the lawyer to preserve the c8nfidences and secrets of a
client.81 DR 4-101 defines a "confidence" as "information protected by the
attorney-client privilege."82 "Secrets" are defined as "other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held
inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely
to be determintal to the client."83 EC 4-4 states that the lawyer's ethical obli-
gation to guard the confidences and secrets of his clients is broader than the
attorney-client privilege, and exists without regard to the fact that "others
share the knowledge."84 Thus, the lawyer is precluded from voluntarily re-
vealing the "secrets" divulged in mediation as well as the "confidences," ex-
cept under certain circumstances.8 5 Only "confidences," however, would be
excluded from evidence if the attorney were compelled to testify in an action
between the parties.
The rules of evidence that define the statements which qualify as DR 4-
101 "confidences" generally consider statements made in the presence of a
joint client not to be confidential in an action between the parties.8 6 Such
statements, therefore, are not within the attorney-client privilege except with
regard to third parties not privy to the conversation. The presence of an op-
78. Id.
79. ABA Code, supra note 35, at DR 5-105(A), (C).
80. Id. at DR 5-105(C).
81. Id. at EC 4-1 through 4-6, DR 4-401 (A), (B), (C), (D).
82. Id. at DR 4-401(A).
83. Id.
84. Id. at EC 4-4.
85. Id. at DR 4-101(B).
86. See note 50 supra; Hurlburt v. Hurlburt, 128 N.Y. 420, 28 N.E. 651 (1891); Brown v.
Green, 3 N.C. App. 506, 165 S.E.2d 534 (1969); Comment, Witnesses-Privileged Professional
Communications as Affected by the Presence of Third Parties, 36 Mich. L. Rev. 641, 644 (1938).
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posing party during a communication raises a presumption that the communi-
cation was not intended to be confidential. This presumption can be rebutted,
however, by a showing that the client reasonably intended for his statements to
remain confidential. 87 Common sense dictates a finding that joint clients rea-
sonably intend, confidentiality when they sign an agreement stating that all
matters discussed in mediation are confidential and that the attorney cannot
be subpoenaed by either party to testify in a later action.
Mediation services have attempted to deal with the problem of confidenti-
ality by requiring both spouses to sign such an agreement.88 The parties may
also be required to stipulate in the contract that any information disclosed
during mediation is made with a view toward settlement or compromise,
therefore it is excluded by rules of evidence. 89 It is unclear whether such
agreements are enforceable. Generally, all competent persons may be com-
pelled to testify and produce evidence as an aid to the administration of jus-
tice.90 Evidentiary privileges provide limited exceptions to this rule.91 The
state's interest in hearing all evidence relevant to a particular case may there-
fore override the voluntary agreement of the parties.
The rule of evidence requiring exclusion of an offer of compromise does
not normally encompass all information revealed in settlement negotiations.
In most jurisdictions independent statements of fact made in connection with
an offer of compromise are admissible.92 The test is whether a statement is
made hypothetically in order to effect a settlement or is intended to be an
unconditional assertion.93 A confidentiality agreement may be enforceable
only in part, therefore, the couple should be warned that confidentiality of
mediation sessions cannot be assured, even after execution of such an agree-
ment.
87. People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 138 N.E.2d 799 (1956); Comment,
supra note 86, at 647. See Yaron v. Yaron, 83 Misc.2d 276, 372 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1975); Ellis v. Ellis,
63 Tenn. App. 361, 472 S.W.2d 741 (1971).
88. E.g., Family Mediation Association Marital Mediation Rules, Section 21, reprinted in 0.
Coogler, supra note 20, at 121-22; The "Agreement in Mediation of the American Arbitration
Association also contains such a provision. Pickrell & Bendheim, supra note 3, at 28.
89. Family Mediation Association Marital Mediation Rules, Section 21, supra note 88, at
122. It is a general rule that offers of compromise are inadmissable as evidence of an admission by
the party making the offer. See 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 629 (1967); Annot. 15 A.L.R.3d 13(1967); 2 D. Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence § 180, at 56 (H. Brandis rev. 1973); Rules of
Evidence, supra note 50, rule 408, at 33-37.
90. 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witness § 28 (1967). See Comment, Functional Overlap Between the
Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71
Yale L.J. 1226, 1228 (1962).
91. 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witness § 28 (1967); Comment, supra note 90, at 1228.
92. 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 630 (1967); Annot. 15 A.L.R.3d 13,22 (1967). See e.g., Rose v.
Rose, 112 Cal. 341, 44 P. 658 (1896); Lewis v. Lewis, 192 N.C. 267, 134 S.E. 486 (1926); Eagle Ins.
Co. v. Albright, 3 Wash. App. 256, 474 P.2d 920 (1970). Federal Rule of Evidence 408, however,
states that evidence of an offer or acceptance of an offer to compromise a claim is not admissible
to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. The Rule further states that
"[e]vidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible."
Rules of Evidence, supra note 50, at 33-37.
93. 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 630 (1967). Even an independeit statement of fact made
during compromise negotiations may be inadmissible, however, if the party states that it was made
without prejudice and in the confidence that a compromise would be reached. Id.
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The previous examination of the ethical guidelines for attorneys indicates
that attorney-mediation is a permissible option. The interests of both the at-
torney-mediator and the mediating couple, however, require the following
precautions to be taken if an attorney assumes the mediation role. First, the
attorney should ascertain whether the couple's goal on entering mediation is to
reach a fair settlement without consideration of fault. He should be certain
that both spouses are capable of making informed and independent decisions
about support, property and custody matters. If either party appears unable to
make such decisions, he or she should be advised to retain outside counsel for
advice during the mediation process. 94
Second, in order to comply with the disclosure provisions of DR 5-
105(C), the attorney should hold an initial information session with the parties
to disclose the possible adverse effects of mediation. This disclosure should
include a warning that mediation sessions may not be confidential in an action
between the parties,95 a warning that the attorney would be required to with-
draw from mediation if hostilities increase,96 and a warning that the attorney
is not acting as an advocate for either party. The attorney should then obtain
a written and informed consent from each spouse to prevent later allegations
of fraud, duress, or undue influence.97
Third, if litigation is underway prior to the commencement of mediation,
the parties should be required to dismiss or suspend the court action. If the
parties decide to resort to litigation during the mediation process, the attorney-
mediator should withdraw from further involvement.98
Finally, if the couple reaches a mutually acceptable settlement, the attor-
ney should draft the agreement and fully explain its provisions to both parties.
He should then terminate his representation of either spouse in any matter
concerning their marital relationship. He is precluded from representing ei-
ther party in a subsequent divorce action, even if uncontested. 99
94. The parties may also be permitted to have outside counsel present during mediation ses-
sions. Before accompanying a client into mediation, the attorney should be fully informed of the
client's wish to reach a settlement through a nonadversarial approach. The attorney should par-
ticipate in the session only to the extent of advising her client on the consequences of particular
courses of action.
95. The couple may be asked to sign a confidentiality agreement stating that each party
agrees to forego his or her right to subpoena the mediator or mediation work product in any
subsequent legal action. The agreement should also state that all statements made during media-
tion are considered client confidences and secrets, and are for the purpose of reaching a compro-
mise. See notes 81-93 and accompanying text supra.
96. See note 58 and accompanying text supra. Section 5.2 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct require withdrawal of the attorney-mediator if. 1) either of the clients requests his with-
drawal; 2) if any of the conditions for mediation listed in Section 5.1 cannot be met; or 3) if it
becomes apparent that a mutually advantageous adjustment of interests cannot be made. Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 42, at 23.
97. Note, supra note 21, at 103-04. Disclosure standards may be different for different types
of clients. With a less informed or educated client the lawyer must take greater care to ascertain
whether the client comprehends the full implications of mediation. See In re Farr, 264 Ind. 153,
340 N.E. 2d 777 (1976); Holmes v. Holmes, 145 Ind. App. 52,248 N.E.2d208 (1969); In Re Dolan,
76 N.J. 1, 384 A.2d 1076 (1978).
98. ABA Code, supra note 35, at EC 5-15.
99. Id. at EC 5-20.
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Attorney mediation is a permissible and desirable alternative to the ad-
versarial approach in reaching divorce settlements in many jurisdictions. Al-
though an attorney-mediator must be fully aware of his ethical responsibilities
and willing to sharpen his counseling skills, the opportunity to fill a need is
great. The individual and societal benefits °° of providing mediation as an
alternative to litigation in divorce cases makes it an option worth pursuing.
KIMBERLY TAYLOR HARBINSON
100. See notes 9-17 and accompanying text supra.
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